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 Participation of women as a part of firm management becomes one of the nation agenda 
as the Malaysian government introduced a policy to increase women involvement at 
least 30% in corporate sectors in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to examine 
whether the characteristics of women as decision maker influence firm performance.  
Based on 2384 firm observations from year 2001 to 2012, this study finds that women 
education level, age and ownership have a relationship with firm performance. These 
findings indicate that women directors who are older in age and have a degree 
qualification help to improve firm performance. In contrast, women ownership has a 
negative association with firm performance which indicate that women involvement in 
a company as shareholders do no contribute to the incremental of firm performance.  
Large firms enjoy high performance whilst capital intensive firms struggling in their 
performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Women participation as a labour force contribute 
to  Malaysia economic and nation development  
cannot be neglected as the rate of women 
participation in Malaysian labour force is expected to 
be increase from 47.3% in the year 2014 to 55% in 
the year 2015 (The Star, 9 March 2015).  Knowing 
that gender diversity is important in a firm, the 
Malaysian government has come out with a policy 
that firms board of directors should consist of at least 
30% women participation, specifically at the 
managerial level ( The Star, June 27, 2011). This 
policy shows that women are giving an equal right 
with male counterpart in making firm decisions 
including the enhancement of firm performance.   
 The important of women as a part of 
management level has been recognised in developed 
country like the US as the females account for over a 
third of managers  overall (Dezso’ and Ross, 2012). 
Similarly in Norway, the proportion of women in 
Norwegian listed firm increased from about 6% in 
2000 to 22% in 2005.  Study by Dezso’ and Ross 
(2012) in the US find that female participation does 
improve firm performance that measured based on 
Tobin’s Q. However, the positive relationship is only 
applicable for female participation below than CEO 
level as they find no positive effects from a female 
CEO.  They also find that female management style 
enhance firm performance by facilitating teamwork 
and innovation.   This finding is in line with Smith, 
Smith and Verner (2005) who find that the 
proportion of women among top management and on 
board of directors tend to have a significantly 
positive effect on firm performance. Similarly, they 
also find that women who hold CEO post do not 
contribute to the increment in firm performance. 
They comment that this result is due to few Danish 
firms that have female CEO. 
 In Malaysia, several studies have been 
conducted that examine the relationship between 
women participation and firm performance. For 
example,  Amran (2011) finds that firms that lead by 
women have lower Tobin’s Q as compared to male-
led firm performance.  Further, Zainal et al. (2013) 
also produce the same evidence as they find that 
firms which board solely consist of male directors 
outperform firms that have combination of male and 
female directors. However, previous studies do not 
focus on the effect of directors personal attributes on 
firm performance.  In order to fill the above 
mentioned gap, the main objective of this paper is to 
investigate whether directors attributes specifically 
women directors can enhance firm’s financial 
performance.  
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 This study is organized as follows. Next, a 
review of literature will be presented, followed by a 
discussion on research methods. Results will be 
presented in the following section. Finally, this paper 
ends with a conclusion section.  
 
 Theoretical Perspectives & Hypotheses 
Development: 
Human Capital Theory and Social Network 
Theory: 
 Hungenberg, Wulf and Stein (2007) claim that 
human capital theory is based on resource-based 
theory which mainly concentrates on the specific 
type of resources to which it assigns an accentuated 
role.  This specific type of resources is the human 
capital which comprises all individual skills, abilities 
and experiences of a company’s employees and 
managers at all levels. Human capital theory assumes 
that valuable resources which cannot or can hardly 
be imitated, substituted and transferred are the main 
prerequisites for a company’s success. Skill 
specialization, educational and prior experience and 
training will reduce human capital development cost 
to the firm and allow the incumbent a higher level of 
productivity. Meanwhile, social network theory 
explains how managers accumulate power using 
several mechanisms such as special expertise, 
experience, industry specialization, prestige, 
ownership, age and longer tenure (Goodstein & 
Boeker, 1991; Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993). Therefore, women as human capital 
of the company may have control over valuable 
resources and use their social network power to 
enhance firm performance.   
 
Women Characteristics and Firm Performance: 
 Firm performance is well recognized as a 
performance indicator to evaluate the sustainability 
of corporate growth and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of management in allocating and handling 
companies’ resources. Sustainability in corporate 
growth deals with how companies can create a stable 
and sustainable income so that the return to the 
shareholders is predictable for every period. 
Commonly, there are two types of firm’s 
performance measures: accounting-based and 
market-based performance measures. Examples of 
accounting based performance measures are profit 
margin, operating profit, earnings per share, net 
income, return on assets, return on equity, return on 
investment and cash flows.   Some measures of 
market based performance are stock price, stock 
returns, market adjusted returns, Tobin’s Q, 
economic value added (EVA) and market value 
added (MVA).  
 There are extant of studies that address the 
relationship between board characteristics and 
financial performance relying on accounting-based 
performance measures (e.g, Johl, Kaur & Cooper, 
2015;  Shukeri, Wei Shin & Shaari, 2012;  Dezso’ & 
Ross, 2012; Adam & Ferreira, 2009; Smith, Smith & 
Verner, 2005) and market-based performance 
measures as well as combinations of both (Amran, 
2011; Abdullah, Ku Ismail & Nachum, 2013). 
However, there is limited study that specifically 
addressed the relationship between women director 
characteristics and firm performance.  
 
Age (AGE): 
 A demographic characteristic such as age is 
commonly used to determine the effectiveness in 
managing the firms. With regard to the age of 
directors, the Companies Act 1965 prohibits the 
appointment of a person of or over the age of 70 
years as a director of a public company or subsidiary 
of a public company. The office of a director shall 
become vacant until the forthcoming annual general 
meeting after he attains the age of 70 years. If the 
vacancy is not filled at the meeting, it may be filled 
as a casual vacancy. In addition, Kang (2002) claims 
that there is a provision in the company’s articles 
regarding the retirement by rotation of directors so as 
to afford the shareholders of the company the 
opportunity to review the director’s performance. For 
listed companies, the election of directors is to take 
place every year; and for all directors including the 
managing directors, they need to retire at least once 
in every three years but they are eligible for re-
election.  
 Some studies suggest that young manager with 
little experience have limited effectiveness because it 
takes time to gain an adequate understanding of the 
company. For example, in CEO turnover study, 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), split their sample into 
two categories; young CEOs (aged less than 54 
years) and older CEOs (aged at least 54 years). They 
find that in the young CEO sample (less than 54 
years) where mandatory retirement has no influence, 
the inverse relation between stock price performance 
and probability of turnover is highly significant.  In 
the old CEO sample (54 years or more), the 
relationship between performance and turnover 
becomes positive but insignificant. Further, Cheng, 
Chan and Leung (2010) assert that young manager 
has tendency to accept new ideas found but refuse to 
accept status quo.  
 In term of relationship between firm 
performance and age, previous study mixed results. 
For example, Dagsson (2011) find a positive 
relationship between age of directors and firm 
performance, while Akpan and Amran (2014) do not 
find any significant association between performance 
and directors’ age. Besides, age can also be used as a 
proxy for manager knowledge. It is commonly stated 
that young managers are less experienced, therefore 
they have lower information level about the internal 
and external environment of the firm (Lausten, 
2002).   As the age is use as a proxy of effectiveness, 
these studies suggest that the older the individual, the 
58                                                                            Rokiah Ishak et al, 2015 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 9(9) Special 2015, Pages: 56-62 
 
greater the understanding of the firm and its industry, 
and the better the performance of the firm.  
H1: There is positive relationship between firm 
performance and older women directors.  
 
Educational Background (EDU): 
 Moving towards emerging and competitive 
market, the career background of managers has 
shifted from a production man to a professional 
manager with a higher educational background. A 
higher educational background such as the post-
graduate level will increase the value of individual’s 
human capital (Phan & Hoon, 1995). Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) claim that managers with higher 
educational backgrounds are considered as  having a 
higher cognitive ability, higher capacity for decision 
processing, higher tolerance for ambiguity and 
propensity or receptivity to innovation which equip 
them with an effective solution for a complex 
decision making task. Thus, managers with a high 
education qualification are regarded as valuable 
human capital to the company and can use their 
knowledge to enhance firm performance.   
H2: There is positive relationship between firm 
performance and women director’s educational 
level.  
 
Professional Qualification (PRO):  
 Directors are often cited as the key player that 
influences a firm’s overall strategies. They are the 
top manager and the strategies they pursue are 
expected to make a difference. Kotter (1982) claims 
that manager who spent his or her career in just one 
or two industries will have greater knowledge 
concerning those industries’ product lines and 
manufacturing processes than a manager who has 
moved across several different industries. Zajac and 
Stearns (1997) suggest that managers with finance 
and legal functional backgrounds as professional or 
expert. They list two reasons why managers with 
finance and legal backgrounds are considered as 
professionals or experts. First, their knowledge 
requires a professional type of education and 
secondly, their skill is highly specialized in terms of 
what they had learned. Since their skills are 
appropriate for the firms, thus, they can enhance firm 
performance. Study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
found that board members who are equipped  with 
accounting education tend to disclose more 
information. Similarly, Yermack (2006) claimed that 
share price react positively with directors who hold 
accounting and finance professional qualification.  
H3: There is positive relationship between firm 
performance and women director’s professional 
qualification.  
 
Ownership (OWN): 
 Agency theory discusses that there will be a 
convergence of interest between agent and principal. 
One way to solve this problem and to make the top 
management’s interest aligns with shareholders’ 
interest is by allowing the top management to have 
some shares in the company. As the management 
owns some portion of company’s share, they are now 
becoming the owners of the firms. As a result, they 
will put in their best efforts to enhance the firm’s 
performance in order to maximize their own wealth. 
Empirical evidences showed that managerial 
ownership is effective at certain ownership level 
(Morck et al. 1988; Denis et al. 1997). Studies by 
Morck et al. (1988) and Pergola (2005) find a 
curvilinear relationship between firm’s value and the 
number of shares owned by management. They 
reported an increment in firm value when managerial 
ownership is between 0 percent to 5 percent and 
above 25 percent respectively. However, when the 
managerial ownership is between 5 percent to 25 
percent, there is a decrement in firm’s value. A 
similar finding is also discussed by Ghosh et al. 
(2007) who provides evidence that the controlling 
power of a managers over firms’ decision depends of 
the level on ownership possessed by the manager. If 
the controlling power is less than 5 percent, their 
influence is not significant and as the controlling 
power is more than 25 percent, their power will be 
significantly increased. These findings are consistent 
with the management entrenchment hypothesis as the 
hypothesis posits that when management ownership 
level increases beyond a certain level, the manager’s 
interest is aligned with the shareholders’ interest 
because at this level the manager is also the owner of 
the firm. As a result, they will put in their best efforts 
to enhance the firm’s performance in order to 
maximize their own wealth.  
H4: There is positive relationship between firm 
performance and women director’s ownership.  
 
Control Variables: 
 Firm size and industry classification are among 
potential firm characteristics that may play important 
roles in appointing women as board members. Firm 
size is measured as natural log of book value over 
total assets and leverage  industry classification is  
classified under capital intensive industries are firms 
that heavily invest in R&D, namely the technology, 
construction, properties, IPC and hotel industries. 
They are coded as ‘1’ and other industries are coded 
as ‘0’ (Zajac & Stearns, 1997). 
 
Research Methodology: 
 The sample of this study is all companies listed 
on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia that have 
women on board. The years of study are from 2001 
to 2012 with a final sample of 2384 firm 
observations. Data on women directors are gathered 
from the annual reports. Financial data are retrieved 
from Datastream. The regression model use in this 
paper is: 
PERFit = α + β1AGEit + β2EDUit + β3PROit + 
β4OWNit β5FSIZEit + β5INDit + ɛit 
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Table 1: The variables and their operation measures.  
Variables Operational measures 
Return On Assets (ROA) Profit before interests and taxes by the firm’s total assets 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) Net income by number of outstanding shares 
Women age (AGE) Age of women director 
Women education level (EDU) 
Women professional qualification (PRO) 
 
Women ownership (OWN) 
1 1– has a degree qualification and above, 0- otherwise 
1– has a background in accounting and finance, 
0-  otherwise 
Percentage of shares owned by women directors 
Firm size (FSIZE) Natural log of total assets in million (RM) 
Industry dummy (INDUSTRY) 1– capital intensive industry, 0- otherwise 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for 
both continuous and dichotomous variables. Our 
findings suggest that on average, firms in this study 
enjoy a healthy performance with a positive ROA 
with an average of 5.138 and the mean of EPS is 
0.121. On average, the age of women directors is 51 
years with the maximum age is 90 years old. This 
result shows that on average the age of women on 
board is consider as old which is more than 50 years 
old. Sixty eight percent of women directors have 
higher academic qualification as they obtained a 
degree or above qualification like master degree and 
PhD. However, in terms of their professional 
qualification in accounting and finance only 25% of 
women directors have that qualification. Women 
directors also do not have significant control over 
firms as on average, they only owned 15.35 percent 
of firms share. In other words, their opinion is less 
likely take into account by other board of directors.  
Large firms tend to have women as their board 
members  due to large number of board size which 
create gender diversity. Further, women involvement 
in firms that classified as capital intensive is low as 
compared to other industry as only 21.9% percent of 
women in this kind of industry. This may be due to 
complexity of firm activities which required 
knowledge and capable directors to handle the 
complex test which is less suitable for women. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistic (N=2384). 
Variables Min Max Mean 
ROA -5.251 21.222 5.138 
EPS 0.000 4.750 0.121 
AGE 0.000 90.000 50.530 
EDU 0.000 1.000 0.680 
PRO 0.000 1.000 0.250 
OWN 0.000 29.080 15.350 
FSIZE 4.664 5.432 4.831 
INDUSTRY 0.000 1.000 0.219 
 
 Table 3 presents the correlation analysis. The 
evidence suggests that on correlation basis, firm 
performance which measured by ROA is only 
significantly associated with firm size and for EPS 
measurement, performance is significantly correlate 
with women director age, ownership, firm size and 
industry classification.  Older women directors have 
lower education level, professional qualification and 
hold a small portion of firm shares. Education level 
has a positive association with professional 
qualification which means that directors who 
obtained high level of education also have a 
background in accounting and finance. However, the 
high education level and professional qualification of 
women directors do not contribute to high portion of 
ownership control as their association are negative 
and significant. This result shows that high educated 
women with accounting and finance background 
hold a small number of shares which limit their 
control over the firm.  Large firms tend to have 
higher performance as both ROA and EPS show a 
positive and significant correlation.  Further, their 
board also consists of older women as the age 
variable show a positive association. In contrast, 
capital intensive firms have a negative association 
with performance (EPS), ownership and firm size. 
These results imply that firms that classified as 
capital intensive firms do have low performance, less 
controlled by women directors and smaller in size. 
None of the correlation is too high to suggest severe 
multicollinearity threats (see Nunally, 1978). 
 Results from the logistic regression analysis are 
presented in Table 4. From four hypotheses variables 
and using EPS as performance measurement, three 
variables namely AGE, EDU and OWN show a 
significant results. The AGE coefficient is positive 
and significant at 1% level which indicates that older 
women directors do improve firm performance. 
Similar result is appeared in the ROA’s model as the 
coefficient is positive and significant at 5% level. As 
the median age from our descriptive results is 51 
years old which is about three years prior to 
retirement, we argue that the age group of directors 
of between 50-55 years old represents a critical 
group of near retirement group. These directors may 
have to tread carefully between maintaining their 
reputation in the labour market or pressing for the 
last bonus/pay they would likely receive.  
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.ROA 1 0.383 0.042 0.027 0.023 -0.017 0.122** 0.001 
2. EPS  1 0.111** 0.029 -0.014 -0.108** 0.172** -0.061** 
3. AGE   1 -0.231** -0.159** -0.115** 0.069** -0.001 
4. EDU    1 0.389** -0.196** 0.007 0.021 
5.PRO     1 -0.130** 0.015 -0.046 
6.OWN      1 -0.056** -0.042* 
7.FSIZE       1 -0.133** 
8. INDUSTRY        1 
** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 Results in Table 4 show a significant sign of 
EDU which indicates that the degree qualification of 
women directors is important in determining firm 
performance. The coefficient of EDU is positive and 
significant at 10 percent level. This can be explained 
that high education level can marginally contribute to 
high performance as the women directors can use 
their knowledge to implement policy and strategies 
that can enhance firm performance.   Women 
directors with a background in accounting and 
finance are considered as directors with skill and 
functional background. This study hypothesized that 
women directors equipped with these qualifications 
are more likely to enhance firm performance as their 
skills are needed in managing the firms. Results in 
Table 4 also show that there is a positive 
insignificant relationship between professional 
qualification and firm performance. This result 
implies that the firm performance is not influenced 
by manager qualification in accounting and finance. 
Although these skills are usually needed in most 
businesses, only 25% of the women directors have 
some accounting and finance background. The 
insignificant coefficient of professional qualification 
suggests that accounting and finance background is 
perceived as less important quality required for a 
directors. These finding is in line with Zajac and 
Westphal (1996) who argue that managers with an 
industry specialization related to a firm’s business 
operation is more important regardless of his level of 
skill and functional background. 
 Percentage of shares owned by women directors 
may also have a significant influence on firm 
performance. When women directors have some 
control on firms via ownership they may intervene in 
decision making. Thus, this study expects that there 
will be a positive relationship between women 
director ownership (OWN) with firm performance. In 
other words, it is predicted that a women director 
who owns shares in the same company will improve 
firm performance as their interest is aligned with 
other shareholders interest. However, the result fails 
to support Hypothesis 4 as it shows that women 
director ownership has a negative relationship with 
firm performance as the coefficient is negatively 
significant at 1% level. One explanation that this 
study can offer is that even though  ownership can 
aligned the interest of the directors and help in 
improving firm performance, but due to the small 
portion of ownership with the average of 15 percent 
will not give women directors a significant control 
over firms decision. In other words, they cannot use 
their ownership power to influence board of directors 
in making their policies and strategies in managing 
firm’s activities. 
  
Table 4: Regression analysis for women director’s characteristic  and firm performance. 
 EPS ROA 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
AGE 
0.093*** 
(0.000) 
0.045** 
(0.018) 
EDU 
0.042* 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.452) 
PRO 
-0.035 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.480) 
OWN 
 
FSIZE 
 
INDUSTRY 
 
-0.085*** 
(0.000) 
0.162*** 
(0.000) 
-0.045** 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.124*** 
(0.154) 
0.015 
(0.463) 
CONS 
-3.391*** 
(0.032) 
-1.434 
(1.303) 
R2 0.228 0.137 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, * significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
 We also find that bigger firms tend to have high 
performance as performance coefficient measured by 
both ROA and EPS respectively, show a positive and 
significant relationship.  The study also find that 
capital intensive firms have low performance may be 
due to huge investment in research and development 
and for machineries and equipment. These 
investments need some times to get back the return. 
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As a result, the capital intensive firms may suffer 
some losses in a few earlier years. 
 
Conclusion: 
 The study investigates possible ramifications of 
women director characteristics on firm performance 
in Malaysia from 2001 to 2012. We find that the age 
of the women director and education level influence 
firm performance. It could be as simply as older 
CEOs might be try to maximize their last pay. 
Further, women director with high education level 
will use their knowledge to improve firm 
performance.  However, still few companies that 
accepted the involvement of women directors as the 
portion of share allocated to women is still low. This 
gives a limit to women directors to intervene in firm 
policies and strategies which can enhance firm 
performance.  
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